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NOTES
WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCOVERY OF INFORMATION GENERATED BY
NON-TESTIFYING DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIC
EXPERTS
ELIZABETH F. MARINGER *
INTRODUCTION

For defendants contemplating raising the insanity defense to a criminal charge or presenting mitigating evidence in a capital sentencing pro-

ceeding, the possibility that the prosecution may discover and subpoena
consulting psychiatric experts has tremendous consequences. The ability

to pursue a mental health defense can mean the difference between a conviction for murder and manslaughter,I between freedom and penal incarceration,' even between life and death.3 Nevertheless, whether the
* I would like to thank Professor Edward M. Chikofsky for his invaluable assistance and support.
1. Psychiatric testimony may be offered by the defense as mitigating evidence to
reduce a criminal sentence. For example, evidence of extreme emotional disturbance can
reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
201-16 (1977).
2. A finding of not guilty by reason of insanity relieves defendants of all criminal
responsibility. See Seymour L. Halleck, M.D., The Mentally Disordered Offender 46
(1986). As a result, although defendants who successfully invoke the defense may be
institutionalized, they avoid penal incarceration. See id. at 66-69; Norman J. Finkel,
Insanity on Trial 127 (1988). The most notorious example is the continued hospitalization of John W. Hinckley, Jr., accused of attempting to assassinate President Reagan and
whom a jury acquitted as not guilty by reason of insanity. For an analysis of the Hinckley trial and disposition, see generally Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense and the
Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. (1984); Peter W. Low et al., The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.: A Case Study in the Insanity Defense (1986).
3. Due process entitles defendants convicted of capital murder to present evidence in
mitigation at a separate sentencing proceeding. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 60409 (1978). The thoroughness with which defense counsel investigate and present mitigating circumstances can significantly affect the outcome of a capital case. See, e.g., Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 652 (1 1th Cir.) (noting that "if not for counsel's omissions
in the representation he provided his client in the penalty phase, the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different"), cert denied, 488 U.S. 872 (1988).
In fact, by "fail[ing] to discover or present such evidence, counsel ... '[may create] the
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less
severe penalty.'" Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 319 (1983) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at
605). Courts and commentators raise similar concerns. See, e.g., Loyd v. Whitley, 977
F.2d 149, 156-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that failure to explore fully and present neuropsychiatric defects as mitigating evidence during sentencing phase of capital trial deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2343 (1993);
Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1308 (8th Cir.) (holding counsel ineffective for
failing to introduce lay or expert mitigating psychiatric evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 431 (1991); American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 93 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Defense
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prosecution may discover information generated by psychiatric experts
consulted by the defense, but not called to testify, if defendants raise the
insanity defense is an unsettled question.4
During the ordinary course of trial preparation, defense counsel may
develop evidence that, if discovered and used by the prosecution, would
be detrimental, if not fatal, to the defense. Consider an attorney repreGuidelines] (noting that "investigation should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be
introduced by the prosecutor"); Goodpaster, supra, at 305 (proposing specific standards
of attorney competence tailored to requirements of penalty phase of capital trial); Ronald
J. Fleury, Capital Case Overturnedfor Ineffective Assistance But Court Finds No Per Se
Violation, 126 N.J. L.J. 164, July 26, 1990 at 4 (discussing New Jersey Supreme Court
opinion finding trial counsel ineffective by failing explore sanity issues at penalty phase
and reversing conviction and death sentence).
Because capital punishment is irreversible, defense attorneys arguably have a higher
duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence in a capital case than in the noncapital context. See ABA Defense Guidelines, supra, at 96. At the penalty phase, defense attorneys' role is to persuade sentencers to empathize with capital defendants. See
id. at 135. To that end, defense counsel often use expert testimony both to rebut aggravating evidence and to establish mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 322-23 (1989) (holding that failure to instruct jury to consider evidence of
mental retardation as mitigating factor violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423-25 (1987) (holding that use of psychiatric evidence prepared to determine competency to stand trial to rebut defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not violate Fifth or Sixth Amendment because defense counsel had
joined motion for examination and had raised mental status defense); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983) (holding jury should not be barred from hearing expert psychiatric testimony regarding defendant's future dangerousness); Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 466-69 (1981) (holding that use at sentencing proceeding of psychiatric report
prepared to determine competency to stand trial violated Fifth and Sixth Amendments
where defendant was not advised of Miranda rights); Woomer v. Aiken, 856 F.2d 677,
682 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that use of psychiatric evidence did not violate Fifth or Sixth
Amendment because defendant consented to sanity evaluation and was advised of Miranda rights), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 (1989).
The decision whether to call experts to testify at the penalty phase of a capital trial thus
has far-reaching consequences for defendants. Nevertheless, defense counsel may be inclined to withhold expert testimony as to defendants' mental health from capital
sentencers. One attorney, for example, "had a psychologist examine his client... before
his 1982 trial-but wouldn't allow the doctor to testify ....
Like many other defense
attorneys, he assumed talk of brain disorders, mental retardation or childhood abuse
could evoke fear instead of empathy. . . ." Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the
Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 323,
359 n. 136 (1992) (citing Marcia Coyle et al., Trial and Errorin the Nation's Death Belt:
FatalDefense, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 34); see also Ellen F. Berkman, Note,
Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstancein CapitalSentencing, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
291, 304 (1989) (discussing defense counsels' dilemma concerning use of evidence of defendants' mental illness).
4. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that statements made by defendant to psychiatrist hired to assist in trial preparation
were privileged) with Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (6th Cir.) (holding no
entitlement to habeas corpus relief on basis of constitutionally mandated attorney-psychiatrist-patient privilege when state called defense psychiatrist as witness), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1010 (1983) and United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding decision to admit testimony for prosecution of defense psychiatrist did not violate constitution), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
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senting an indigent defendant charged with a heinous crime who explores
the viability of the insanity defense by requesting a court-appointed psychiatric expert. That expert, after examining the client, may send a written report concluding that the defendant was legally sane at the time of
the offense and that the viability of an insanity plea is dubious at best.
A persistent defense attorney may decide, however, to consult a second
expert and may thereby obtain a conclusion favorable to the assertion of
the insanity defense. Even if counsel then informs the government of the
defendant's intent to raise the defense and makes the client available for
examination by a prosecution expert, the government might seek to discover the initial expert's report and, quite possibly, to call that expert to
testify. The diligent attorney, unintentionally, may have created a witness for the prosecution.
These facts demonstrate the dilemma facing defense counsel seeking to
prepare a psychiatric defense. On one hand, defendants have a vital interest in protecting communications made to defense psychiatric experts
and, in turn, communications between those experts and defense counsel.
On the other hand, the government has an interest in obtaining full disclosure given the need to provide the triers of fact with all relevant information and witnesses. This Note examines prosecutorial discovery of
non-witness defense psychiatric expert information in the context of both
common law privilege doctrines and constitutional principles.
Part I provides background regarding defendants' use of expert psychiatric assistants in criminal cases.5 This part also discusses the Supreme
Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma6 to grant criminal defendants a due
process right of access to psychiatric experts to assist in the preparation
of the insanity defense.7 Part II discusses courts' application of common
law privilege doctrines to the issue of prosecutorial discovery of non-witness expert information.8 Part III analyzes discovery in the context of
these evidentiary privileges. 9 Part IV addresses the impact of
prosecutorial discovery on criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment protections in light of Ake. 10
This Note concludes that privilege law protects communications between defendants, defense attorneys, and defense psychiatric experts consulted for purposes of trial preparation. Specifically, communications
between criminal defendants and consulting psychiatrists fall within the
attorney-client privilege; communications between defense attorneys and
consulting psychiatrists constitute litigation work product. Finally, by
raising the insanity defense at trial, defendants do not waive either of
these protections. This Note also suggests that prosecutorial discovery of
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
470 U.S. 68 (1985).
See infra notes 22-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97-157 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
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evidence generated by psychiatrists consulted, but not called to testify, by

criminal defendants preparing for trial or for a capital sentencing proceeding has serious implications for the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel."
I.

PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The increasing use of psychiatric experts by defendants to assist them
in preparing and presenting a successful mental health defense to a criminal charge has forced courts to redefine the role of psychiatry in the
criminal justice system.12 With this revision has come the recognition
11. Prosecutorial discovery of information cultivated by non-witness defense psychiatric experts also raises due process and Fifth Amendment concerns that are beyond the
scope of this Note.
In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Supreme Court relied on the due process
clause to guarantee criminal defendants access to psychiatric experts. See id. at 87-88.
The Court reasoned:
When a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a
criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair
opportunity to present his defense. This elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal where,
simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.
Id. at 76. On this basis, the Court envisioned "access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." Id. at 83.
A rule allowing the prosecution access to psychiatric experts not called by the defense
to testify at trial arguably infringes upon the very right guaranteed by Ake. Interpreting
Ake, Justice Marshall has written:
If the psychiatrist appointed to assist the defendant determines that the defendant was not insane at the time of the offense, he probably will not be able to
provide much helpful testimony for the defense on the insanity issue. But the
psychiatrist's determination may not be revealed to the prosecution for use as
evidence any more than may the results of the investigation and research of the
defendant's court-appointed lawyer.
Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 965 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The possibility for defense consultants to be transformed into prosecution witnesses potentially subverts this due process right.
Prosecutorial access to court-appointed defense psychiatric experts also implicates
criminal defendants' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). Indeed, "the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as interpreted by the Supreme Court... limits prosecutorial discovery to evidence
that the defendant presently intends to use at trial, not evidence he [or she] potentially
may introduce." Eric D. Blumenson, ConstitutionalLimitations on ProsecutorialDiscovery, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 123, 125 (1983). Prosecutorial use of expert information
upon which the defense does not intend to rely thus may jeopardize criminal defendants'
Fifth Amendment rights.
12. One commentator has explained the interplay between law and psychiatry along a
continuum containing four possible relationships. See Peter R. Dahl, Comment, Legal
and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of PsychiatricEvidence in Criminal Trials, 73 Cal.
L. Rev. 411 (1985). First, psychiatry may be of no use to the law, as in the case of strict
liability crimes where defendants' mental state is irrelevant. See id. at 414. Second, psychiatry may advise the law by providing an explanation for behavior which would allow
fact-finders to assess the reasonableness of a particular act. See id. Third, psychiatry
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that defendants without access to expert assistance are at a serious disadvantage both at trial and in a capital sentencing proceeding.
A.

The Role of PsychiatricExperts in CriminalProceedings

Prosecutorial discovery of defense psychiatric evidence is significant
because of the vital role that psychiatric experts play in the modem criminal justice system. 3 Prosecutors and defense attorneys now employ
mental health professionals to assist at virtually all stages of litigation.
Although the enhanced role of psychiatry in the justice process has received heavy criticism, 4 reliance on psychiatric assistance in the pre-trial

evaluation and trial presentation of mental health issues is critical.' 5

may inform the law as to a point on which the justice system is without expertise, such as
whether a particular defendant had the capacity to form the requisite criminal intent. See
id Finally, psychiatric and legal concepts could become coterminous. See id. The law
thus would rely on psychiatry to define legal insanity. For discussions of the role of
psychiatry in the law, see generally Psychiatrists and the Legal Process: Diagnosis and
Debate (Richard J. Bonnie ed., 1977); Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The
Role of Mental HealthProfessionalsin the CriminalProcess: The Casefor Informed Spec-

ulation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427 (1980); Dahli, supra; Joel F. Henning, The Psychiatristin the
Legal Process: Caught in the Seamless Web, in By Reason of Insanity: Essays on Psychi-

atry and the Law 217 (Lawrence Z. Freedman ed., 1983).
This Note focuses on the use of psychiatry to inform the law, as in providing defense
counsel with assessments as to the viability of the insanity defense. This Note also focuses on the use of psychiatry to advise the law, as in providing sentencers with expert
testimony as to mitigating or aggravating evidence at a capital sentencing proceeding or
during the presentation of the insanity defense.
13. Then-Judge Cardozo noted the importance of psychiatric experts as early as 1929.
See Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165 (N.Y. 1929). He stated that "upon the trial of certain
issues, such as insanity .... experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for
defense." Id, at 167.
14. Critics argue that psychiatric experts' participation in the adjudication of insanity
claims is counterproductive because of their inability to predict future dangerousness.
See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920-23 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(discussing problems of predicting future dangerousness); C. Ray Jeffery, Ph.D., Attacks
on the Insanity Defense: Biological Psychiatry and New Perspectives on Criminal Behavior 195-203 (1985) (same). For a discussion of difficulties associated with predicting
future dangerousness in capital cases, see Charles P. Ewing, "Dr.Death"and the Casefor
an Ethical Ban on Psychiatricand PsychologicalPredictions of Dangerousnessin Capital

Sentencing Proceedings, 8 Am. J.L. & Med. 407, 407-08 & n.3 (1983).
Others fear that juries may give expert testimony undue weight. See generally Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 926-27 & n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing effect of expert testimony on juries). But see Finkel, supra note 2, at 167 (noting that jurors usually retain
their independence). Commentators also have expressed concern that experts may be
unable to assess the effect that current mental conditions have had on past behavior. See
Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumptionof Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 693, 733 (1974).

Finally, some argue that, even if psychological differences among offenders are legally
significant, mental health professionals should not testify as expert witnesses. For a discussion of the current debate, see Rita J. Simon & David E. Aaronson, The Insanity
Defense: A Critical Assessment of Law and Policy in the Post-Hinckley Era 86 (1988);
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 452-96.
15. The Supreme Court acknowledged this trend:
Our recognition since [1953] of elemental constitutional rights, each of which
has enhanced the ability of an indigent defendant to attain a fair hearing, has
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Effective pre-trial defense preparation includes consulting with psychiatric experts on the viability of the insanity defense, as well as using such

experts for strategic and other purposes.

6

Similarly, psychiatric experts

are crucial to defense attorneys assessing whether to present mitigating

evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 7 As a result, "[o]nly a
foolhardy lawyer would determine tactical and evidentiary strategy in a
case with psychiatric issues without the guidance and interpretation of
psychiatrists and others skilled in this field."'"
Defendants rely on psychiatric experts not only to evaluate mental
health evidence, but also to testify and otherwise assist defense counsel at
trial.' 9 Expert testimony enhances juries' ability to understand defend-

ants' behavior and make informed determinations as to criminal culpabil-

ity.2 ° Similarly, capital sentencers may require expert testimony to make
signaled our increased commitment to assuring meaningful access to the judicial process .... [W]e would surely be remiss to ignore the extraordinarily enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law today.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 85 (1985); see also Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at
451 (writing that "the path of the law reflects a discernible trend toward increased rather
than reduced subjectivism-and allied clinical inquiry-in the substantive criminal law").
A significant percentage of qualified mental health professionals, however, refuse to testify in court. See Simon & Aaronson, supra note 14, at 90-92.
16. Courts and commentators agree that, only with the assistance of psychiatrists to
examine defendants and interpret their findings, can attorneys make informed decisions
about whether to pursue insanity or diminished capacity as a defense strategy. See, e.g.,
Ake, 470 U.S. at 80 (noting that psychiatric expert assistance is crucial to marshal defense); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 n.9 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting that consultation with expert enables counsel "to assess the soundness and advisability of offering the
defense") (citations omitted); People v. Knuckles, 589 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (noting that "[t]here can be little doubt that the assistance of a mental health expert
.. is of critical importance to the accused in determining whether an insanity defense
should be raised and in the preparation of such a defense"); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421,
424 (Md. 1979) (finding psychiatrist crucial to assist counsel in understanding psychiatric
concepts and preparing insanity defense); American Bar Association, Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards § 7-3.3 commentary at 81-82 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Mental
Health Standards] (same); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L. Rev. 597, 629 (1980) (same).
17. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18. United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
19. The Fourth Circuit has noted that "the presence or absence of psychiatric testimony is critical to presentation of the [insanity] defense at trial. . . . 'If an accused is to
raise an effective insanity defense, it is clear that he will need the psychiatrist as a witness.'" Taylor, 437 F.2d at 377 n.9 (citations omitted); see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 81
(finding that "the testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and 'a virtual necessity if an
insanity plea is to have any chance of success' ") (quoting Martin R. Gardner, The Myth
of the ImpartialPsychiatricExpert-Some Comments ConcerningCriminalResponsibility
and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 Law & Psychol. Rev. 99, 113 (1976)). Psychiatric experts also assist defense counsel in the cross-examination of government experts.
See id. at 82.
20. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 allows experts to give opinion testimony and to
testify on ultimate issues to be decided by the triers of fact. See Fed. R. Evid. 704. Psychiatric testimony concerning defendants' sanity clearly meets the requirement that such
expert evidence be helpful given the typical laypersons limited understanding of mental
health issues. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-81 (noting that "[t]hrough... testimony, psychia-
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informed decisions concerning the imposition of the death penalty. 2 In
both contexts, the criminal justice system depends upon psychiatry and
the use of expert psychiatric testimony to further the adjudicative
process.
B.

The ConstitutionalGuaranteeof Expert Psychiatric Assistance

In 1985, the United States Supreme Court redefined criminal defend-

ants' right to expert psychiatric assistance in Ake v. Oklahoma.2 Despite

the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,23 indigent defendants
were not constitutionally guaranteed meaningful access to expert psychiatric assistance until Ake.2 4 Indeed, while wealthy defendants have long
25
had the privilege of hiring psychiatric experts as defense consultants,

this right
was significantly more complicated for indigent defendants un26
tl Ake.

trists ideally assist lay jurors ... to make a sensible and educated determination about the
mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense"); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra
note 12, at 468 (noting that expert opinions can "yield insights that are both probative
and valuable to the factfinder").
21. Critics of the use of psychiatric testimony to support mitigating evidence at the
sentencing phase of a capital proceeding cite the unreliability of individualized assessments of defendants' potential for rehabilitation or of defendants' likelihood of recidivism. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 441. In addition, critics decry
prosecutorial reliance on unsubstantiated psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness.
See Ewing, supra note 14, at 407-08 & n.3 (1983). Nevertheless, "sentencing reformers
appear to welcome, as an integral part of the specification of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, clinical inquiries regarding an offender's psychological functioning at the
time of the offense." Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 441-42 (footnote omitted).
22. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1988). The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 entitled criminal defendants whose resources were inadequate to provide for a meaningful defense to
"investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation." Id.
24. For a pre-Ake discussion of criminal defendants' constitutional right to expert
services, see John F. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of CriminalCases: The Constitutionaland Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev. 574 (1982).
25. Class issues have always been part of the debate over defense access to psychiatric
assistance. Insanity has even been referred to as a "rich man's defense." The Insanity
Defense: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1982) (statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch). But see Finkel, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that many insanity acquittals do not involve lengthy trials or require substantial resources); Simon & Aaronson, supra note 14, at 9 (disputing high cost of presenting
insanity defense).
Discovery of non-testifying defense experts by the prosecution raises similar socio-economic concerns. When defendants are wealthy, counsel can consult numerous private
clinicians who will be virtually undiscoverable unless called by the defense to testify. See
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 497. Under this analysis, only indigent defendants
suffer from a broad discovery rule designed to discourage shopping for favorable experts.
26. Prior to the Court's decision in Ake, indigent defendants who requested courtappointed psychiatrists often found themselves with nothing more than disinterested experts upon whom they could not rely. See Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.
Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982). In Granviel, a Texas trial court appointed
a psychiatrist to an indigent defendant pursuant to state law. See id. at 680. The court
read the Texas statute as providing for "'disinterested qualified experts.' As such, they
may be subpoenaed by either party and.., are not ... agents of either defense counsel or
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1. Ake v. Oklahoma
In 1979, Glen Burton Ake shot and killed an Oklahoma couple and
wounded their two children.2 7 Upon observing the defendant's bizarre
behavior during pre-trial proceedings, the state trial judge, sua sponte,
ordered Ake examined to determine his competency to stand trial. 28 After experts diagnosed him as psychotic, paranoid schizophrenic, delusional, and having poor impulse control, the court found Ake dangerous
and committed him to a state hospital. 29 After four months of antipsychotic drug therapy, Ake's condition sufficiently stabilized for the
state to resume criminal proceedings.3 0
At a pre-trial conference, Ake's attorney informed the court of his client's intent to raise the insanity defense and moved for a court-appointed
psychiatrist to assist in the preparation of that defense . 3 The court denied the motion and Ake presented the insanity defense at the guilt phase
of his capital trial without the benefit of psychiatric testimony. 2 The
jury subsequently convicted Ake on all counts. 3 At the penalty phase of
his trial, Ake was similarly without expert testimony to rebut evidence of
future dangerousness or to present mental health evidence in mitiga35
tion.3 ' The jury sentenced him to death.
Ake appealed his conviction and sentence to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, which affirmed.3 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari37 and, recognizing the importance of psychiatric assistance to the
preparation of the insanity defense, reversed. 3 8 The Court reasoned that
psychiatric experts are crucial to investigate and interpret data and to
testify in order to assist lay jurors in making sensible and educated determinations about a defendant's mental condition at the time of an ofthe prosecutor." Id. at 682. Under this interpretation, the court made the expert's report
available to the prosecution as well as to the defense and allowed the government to call
the expert to testify. See id. at 681.
Granviel challenged this decision in federal court as violative of the attorney-client
privilege and of the Sixth Amendment. See id.at 679. Granviel's attorney stressed the
necessity of a psychiatric examination to his client's defense and argued that, while failure
to request an examination would have constituted ineffective assistance, by requesting an
examination he had unintentionally created an adversarial witness. See id. at 682. The
federal district court rejected Granviel's assertion that the lower court violated his Sixth
Amendment rights. See id.
27. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985).
28. See id.at 71.
29. See id.
30. See id.at 71-72.
31. See id.at 72.
32. See id.
33. See id.at 73.
34. See id.

35. See id.
36. See Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
37. See 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
38. See 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985).
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fense.3 9 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall explained:
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether
the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses, the
risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.' °
On that basis, the Court guaranteed criminal defendants a due process

right to expert psychiatric assistance.4 1
2.

The Unresolved Issues

Despite its constitutional mandate, Ake has sparked intense debate
concerning the breadth of its impact.42 The decision's ambiguity directly
affects criminal defendants' ability to reap the benefits the Ake Court
sought to confer. The following unsettled issues are relevant to the question of prosecutorial discovery of information generated by non-witness
defense experts.
Significantly, the Court did not directly address the role of court-appointed psychiatric experts as partisan assistants. The Court implied,
however, that psychiatric experts should act for the defense, noting that
"the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist
39. See id. at 80-81.
40. Id at 82.
41. See idl at 83.
42. For discussions of the implications of Ake for indigent criminal defendants, see
David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for
the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 763 (1990); Susan S. Brown, Note, After Ake: Implementing the Tools of an Adequate Defense, 7 Pace L. Rev. 201 (1986); Blake Champlin, Note,
Due Process and PsychiatricAssistance." Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 Tulsa LJ.121 (1985); Paul
M. Doolittle, Comment, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Indigent CriminalDefendant's Constitutional Right to Psychiatric Assistance, 10 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 731 (1985); Mark P.
Goodman, Note, The Right to a PartisanPsychiatricExpert: Might Indigency Preclude
Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 703 (1986); Brita Haughland, Note, Criminal Procedure:
The Constitutional Extent of the Adequate Tools of a Defense, 39 Okla. L. Rev. 273
(1986); Helen Hubbard, Note, An Indigent's ConstitutionalRight to Expert Psychiatric
Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957 (1985); Donna H. Lee, Note, In the Wake
of Ake v. Oklahoma: An Indigent CriminalDefendant's Lack of Ex Parte Access to Expert Services, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 154 (1992); Kerrin M. McCormick, Note, The Constitutional Right to PsychiatricAssistance: Causefor Reexamination of Ake, 30 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1329 (1993); Michael J. Todd, Note, CriminalProcedure-DueProcess and Indigent
Defendants: Extending FundamentalFairnessto Include the Right to Expert Assistance:
Ake v. Oklahoma, 29 How. L.J. 609 (1986); John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the
Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84
Mich. L. Rev. 1326 (1986); A. Michelle Willis, Comment, NonpsychiatricExpert Assistance and the Requisite Showing of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal Justice
System, 37 Emory L.J. 995 (1988); Paul Zisla, Note, PsychiatricAssistance for Indigent
Defendants Pleading Insanity: The Michigan Experience, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 907
(1987); Note, The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 120, 130-41 (1985).
For a discussion of Ake as a "new rule" for purposes of retroactive relief in habeas
corpus proceedings, see James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 22A.5, at 209 n.56 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense."4 3 Lower
courts have differed in their interpretation of Ake on this point."

Courts should interpret Ake to guarantee partisan expert assistance in
all stages of trial preparation. Justice Marshall, author of the opinion,
later gave Ake this interpretation. He wrote, "Ake mandates the provision of a psychiatrist who will be part of the defense team and serve the
defendant's interests in the context of our adversarial system."4 5 The
American Bar Association and several commentators also have read Ake
as providing indigent defendants the right to partisan assistance.4 6 The
psychiatric profession, however, has questioned the use of mental health
professionals as partisan experts.4 7
In addition, the Ake Court suggested, but failed to establish conclusively, whether requests for expert assistance by indigent defendants can
or should be made ex parte." This ambiguity has given rise to differing
43. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (emphasis added). The Court qualified
this holding, however, by noting that "[t]his is not to say, of course, that the indigent
defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to
receive funds to hire his own ....
[W]e leave to the State the decision on how to implement this right." Id. Fear of expert-shopping may have motivated the Court to impose
this limitation. See Champlin, supra note 42, at 152; West, supra note 42, at 1356; Zisla,
supra note 42, at 914. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that the Court
had, in fact, granted indigent defendants the right "to a 'defense' advocate." Ake, 470
U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Several courts do not interpret Ake as providing indigents the right to partisan
assistance. See Henderson v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (11 th Cir. 1991), modified,
Henderson v. Singletary, 968 F.2d 1309 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 621 (1992);
Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1516-18 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1275
(1992); Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1042 (1987); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 933-35 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 909 (1986); People v. Young, 234 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Other courts, however, have read Ake more expansively. See United States v. Crews, 781
F.2d 826, 834 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.
1985); State v. Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d 390, 395 (N.C. 1986).
45. Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 963 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
46. See ABA Mental Health Standards, supra note 16, § 7-3.3(a) & commentary at
81-82; see also Harris, supra note 42, at 782 (arguing that courts should appoint psychiatrist whose only role is to assist defense); Goodman, supra note 42, at 705 (arguing that
courts must read Ake expansively to provide partisan expert in order to guarantee indigent defendants procedural protections and effective assistance); McCormick, supra note
42, at 1356 (arguing that language in Ake suggests defense entitlement to psychiatrist to
assist in defense preparation and presentation); West, supra note 42, at 1347 (same).
47. See Simon & Aaronson, supra note 14, at 91. A 1960 survey of members of the
American Psychiatric Association showed 10% of psychiatrists categorically refusing to
appear as experts and 20% refusing to appear as partisans. See id. It has been suggested
that these individuals may constitute the most qualified and competent psychiatrists in
the profession. See id. For a critique that impartial experts are inevitably partisan, see
Bernard L. Diamond, M.D., The Fallacy of the ImpartialExpert, in Readings in Law and
Psychiatry 217, 217-19 (Richard C. Allen et al. eds., rev. ed. 1975).
48. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985) (noting only that "[w]hen the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is
likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist
is readily apparent").
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interpretations by lower courts.4 9 The American Bar Association and
certain commentators contend that defense motions for court-appointed

experts should be conducted ex parte5 0 In fact, if courts do not provide
for ex parte hearings, the government necessarily will learn of psychiatric
examinations when indigent defendants request court approval to obtain
expert assistance.-"
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court left unsettled whether the prosecution may have access to any reports generated
by psychiatric experts appointed pursuant to Ake. As a result, at least
one court has allowed the government to use defense expert information.
The Fifth Circuit, in Granviel v. Lynaugh, 2 upheld a state criminal procedure law granting the prosecution access to any reports generated by
court-appointed defense psychiatrists.1 3 Despite the defendant's claim
that this rule denied him his due process right to an independent expert,
the court held that "a court-appointed psychiatrist[ ] whose opinion and
testimony is available to both sides"5" satisfied Ake.
Although the Supreme Court refused to hear the defendant's appeal,"
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the denial of
certiorari.5 6 They argued that the Fifth Circuit's decision was squarely
inconsistent with Ake v. Oklahoma. 7 Justice Marshall drew a comparison between criminal defendants' right to psychiatric assistance and right
to counsel:
Just as an indigent defendant's right to legal assistance would not be
49. See e.g., Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ga. 1989) (finding that Ake did not
mandate ex parte hearings), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); State v. Ballard, 428
S.E.2d 178, 182-83 (N.C. 1993) (finding indigent defendant constitutionally entitled to ex
parte hearing on motion for expert assistance), cert denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Nov.
15, 1993) (No. 93-143); State v. Phipps, 418 S.E.2d 178, 190 (N.C. 1992) (finding discretion to grant ex parte hearings but no constitutional requirement); McGregor v. State,
733 P.2d 416, 416-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (finding intent in Ake to grant ex parte
hearings); State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 255-56 (S.D. 1992) (holding that Ake did not
mandate ex parte hearing).
50. See ABA Mental Health Standards, supra note 16, § 7-3.3(a) & commentary at
84; see also Lee, supra note 42, at 154-55 (arguing that Constitution requires courts to
implement right to expert under Ake through ex parte proceedings); McCormick, supra
note 42, at 1370 & n.241 (suggesting that defendant should explain in ex parte hearing
how psychiatric evaluation could support legal defense). Indeed, a recently-enacted federal death penalty statute provides for ex parte applications to obtain epert assistance.
See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (1988).
51. Though the government may learn of psychiatric examinations informally or by
chance, exparte hearings are necessary to protect indigent defendants from prosecutorial
discovery to the same degree that economic status traditionally has protected wealthy
defendants who are without need of judicial intervention. See Harris, supra note 42, at
779-80; Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1567, 1657 (1986); Lee, supra note 42, at 187 n.215.
52. 881 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990).
53. See id. at 191.
54. Id.
55. See 495 U.S. 963 (1990).
56. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
57. See id.
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satisfied by a State's provision of a lawyer who, after consulting with
the defendant and examining the facts of the case and the applicable
law, presented everything he knew about the defendant's guilt to the
defendant, the prosecution, and the court, so his right to psychiatric
assistance is not satisfied by provision of a psychiatrist who must report to both parties and the court.5
Whether courts grant the government access to reports generated by ex-

perts appointed pursuant to Ake, therefore, may seriously implicate criminal defendants' constitutional rights.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY OF DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIC
EXPERTS

In 1977, a Virginia jury sentenced Michael Marnell Smith to death for
the brutal rape and murder of a woman he encountered near his home.

9

Before trial, Smith requested appointment of a psychiatrist to assist him
in exploring a possible psychiatric defense."° The court appointed Dr.
Wendell Pile who, in the course of examining the defendant, became
aware of adverse facts pertaining to Smith's guilt.6 Under then-existing
Virginia law, court-appointed psychiatric experts routinely forwarded
their reports to the court.62 On that basis, Smith's court-appointed counsel, David Pugh, declined to call Dr. Pile to testify either at trial or at the
sentencing phase of Smith's capital case.6 3 Dr. Pile did testify, however-for the prosecution.'

In 1986, after Smith had exhausted his state remedies and both the
federal district and circuit courts had refused to issue a writ of habeas

corpus, 65 the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to decide whether and,
if so, under what circumstances, a prosecutor may elicit testimony from a
mental health professional concerning the content of an interview conducted to explore the possibility of presenting psychiatric defenses at
trial."' 66 Because Pugh failed to object to Dr. Pile's testimony on direct
58. Id. at 965.
59. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 529 (1986).
60. See id.
61. See id. at 530.
62. See id. at 529.
63. See id. at 530.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 532.
66. Id. at 528. Professor Richard J. Bonnie, John S. Battle Professor of Law at the
University of Virginia School of Law and Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry
and Public Policy in Charlottesville, Virginia, acted as co-counsel for Smith. He submitted a brief urging the Court to hold defense statements to court-appointed psychiatric
experts constitutionally protected. See Petitioner's Brief, Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1986) (No. 85-5487). Amici curiae made similar arguments to the Court in their briefs in
support of the petitioner. See Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amidi Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (No. 85-5487); Motion for Leave to File and Brief
for the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (No. 85-5487).
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appeal to the state court, however, the Supreme Court flatly declined to
reach the merits and affirmed.67 Since then, the Court has not granted
certiorari to consider the constitutional implications of prosecutorial discovery of non-witness defense psychiatric experts.

Without guidance, lower courts before and afterAke remain divided as
to whether the prosecution can discover and use evidence generated by
non-witness defense psychiatric experts when criminal defendants raise
the insanity defense.68 Despite acknowledging the constitutional implications, courts generally have refused to hold that prosecutorial discovery violates the Constitution.69 Instead, they apply common law

privilege doctrines couched in constitutional language.

°

The leading

Alvarez 7

cases, United States v.
and United States ex rel. Edney v.
Smith,7 2 were decided, however, a decade before Ake.
A.

Courts Refusing ProsecutorialAccess to Defense PsychiatricExperts

Several courts have refused to allow prosecutorial discovery and use of
non-witness defense psychiatric expert information.73 In UnitedStates v.

Alvarez,74 a defendant on trial for kidnapping in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sought to raise the insanity
67. See Smith, 477 U.S. at 538-39.
68. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975) (protecting defendant's statements to defense psychiatrist as privileged) with Noggle v. Marshall, 706
F.2d 1408 (6th Cir.) (holding no violation privilege law occurred when state called defense psychiatrist as its witness), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983) and United States ex
reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (allowing defense psychiatrist's
testimony for prosecution on grounds that defendant waived privilege), aff'd without
opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
69. See eg., Noggle, 706 F.2d at 1415 (refusing to reach Sixth Amendment issue);
Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1054 (holding prosecutorial discovery and use of defense expert's
testimony did not rise to level of constitutional violation); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784,
790 (Alaska 1979) (same); see also Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1676 (noting most courts
find government use of defense psychiatric expert does not violate Sixth Amendment).
70. See, eg., Alvarez, 519 F.2d at 1045-46 (using constitutional language but ultimately relying on common law privilege); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (Md. 1979)
(same); see also Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1053-54 (referring to language in Alvarez as constitutional in nature only).
71. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
72. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.),
cerL denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
73. See Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 526
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 790 (Alaska 1979); People v. Lines,
531 P.2d 793, 804 (Cal. 1975); Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1987)
(en banc); People v. Knuckles, 589 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Pratt,
398 A.2d 421, 426 (Md. 1979); People v. Hilliker, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971); State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 425-26 (N.J. 1957). This position has been labeled the majority rule. See Layton, 90 F.R.D. at 525 (noting that "[m]ost of the states
... have treated the attorney-client privilege... favorably, and have protected communications to defense psychotherapists").
74. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
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The court appointed a psychiatric expert pursuant to the

Criminal Justice Act of 1964.76 After the psychiatrist rendered an unfavorable opinion regarding the viability of the insanity defense, the defendant declined to call the expert to testify at trial,7 7 but nonetheless
raised the defense. 78 Having knowledge of the initial expert's opinion,

the government subpoenaed the psychiatrist and, over defense objection,

the trial court compelled him to testify.79 A jury convicted the defendant
and the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment.8"
On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the attorney-client privilege protected the expert's reports. 8' Relying on language that appears
constitutional in nature, the court held that "effective assistance of counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity defense demands recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psychiatric
expert as with the attorney he is assisting."81 2 The court rejected the government's argument that the defendant had waived his attorney-client
privilege by raising the insanity defense, and held that admission of the
expert's testimony was not harmless error.8 3 The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.8 4
B.

Courts Allowing ProsecutorialAccess to Defense Psychiatric Experts

Other courts have granted the prosecution access to information developed by non-testifying defense psychiatric experts.8 5 Of these, the seminal case is United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith.8 6 In Edney, the
defendant was charged with the kidnap and murder of the eight-year-old
daughter of his former girlfriend.8 7 At his trial, the defendant raised the
75. See id. at 1039.
76. See id. at 1045.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1039.
79. See id. at 1045.
80. See id. at 1039.
81. See id. at 1046.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1047.
84. See id.
85. See Lange v. Young, 869 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1094
(1989); Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010
(1983); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 682-83 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1003 (1982); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 954 (1977); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977);
Austin v. Alfred, 788 P.2d 130, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d
668, 679 (Iowa), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 58-59
(Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497,
503 (Nev. 1987); State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 350 (Wash. 1990) (en banc); State v.
Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1035-36 (Wash. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
86. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
87. See People v. Edney, 350 N.E.2d 400, 401 (N.Y. 1976).
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insanity defense and called a psychiatric expert to testify on his behalf."
The court permitted the prosecution to call, in rebuttal, the psychiatrist

who originally had examined the defendant at his counsel's request for
purposes of trial preparation.8 9 This psychiatrist testified for the government that Edney did not suffer from any mental disease or defect and
that Edney knew and appreciated the nature of his acts. 90 A jury con-

victed Edney and both the Appellate Division and the New York Court
of Appeals affirmed the verdict. 9'
The Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client privilege protected

Edney's communications to the psychiatrist but that, by raising the defense, Edney had waived the privilege. 92 The defendant subsequently pe-

titioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the state's discovery and
use of his initial expert denied him effective assistance of counsel. 93 The
court rejected that argument and denied the writ. 94

Judge Weinstein delivered a lengthy and careful analysis of the evidentiary and constitutional implications of allowing the prosecution to call
Edney's initial psychiatric expert to testify. The court concluded that,
although the psychiatric testimony may have violated common law privilege doctrines, the defendant waived any claim of attorney-client privilege by offering expert testimony on the insanity issue. 95 Further, the
court held that admission of the testimony did not rise to the level of the
constitutional violation required to authorize granting the writ. 96
88. See id.
89. See id Ironically, the same psychiatrist, Dr. Daniel Schwartz, medical director of
the Department of Forensic Psychiatry at Kings County Hospital Center in Brooklyn,
New York, initially examined the defendants in both Alvarez and Edney. He was called
to testify for the prosecution at both trials. See id. at 402; United States v. Alvarez, 519
F.2d 1036, 1041 (3d Cir. 1975).
90. See Edney, 350 N.E.2d at 402.
91. See People v. Edney, 366 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 350
N.E.2d at 404.
92. See Edney, 350 N.E.2d at 403.
93. See United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
94. See id. at 1053-54. The court distinguished Alvarez on the ground that Edney
sought a federal writ of habeas corpus attacking a state conviction, whereas Alvarez had
directly appealed a federal conviction. See id. The court understood the Third Circuit
not to have reached the constitutional issue in Alvarez, but rather only to have determined the scope of federal privilege doctrines. See id. at 1054. Other courts have also
read Alvarez this way. See, e.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 682 (5th Cir. Sept.
1981) ("We are not here deciding the scope and appropriate application of the attorneyclient privilege for federal criminal proceedings; hence, we are not at liberty to flatly agree
or disagree with the Third Circuit rule."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982).
95. See Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1054.
96. See id at 1054-55. Despite noting that non-disclosure was the wiser evidentiary
rule, Judge Weinstein did not feel authorized under habeas corpus jurisdiction to
straight-jacket the development of evidentiary privilege law with constitutional limitations. See id
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III. COMMON LAW EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES AS BASES FOR
PROTECTING INFORMATION GENERATED BY DEFENSE
PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTS

Although reaching different conclusions, the courts in United States v.
Alvarez9 7 and UnitedStates ex rel. Edney v. Smith98 both reflect the judi-

cial preference to apply common law privilege doctrines, specifically the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine as limited by
waiver, to the issue of prosecutorial discovery of non-testifying defense
expert information. Because of their freedom to interpret the bounds of
these common law privileges,99 and their failure to parse out the elements
of communications between defendants, attorneys, and experts," ° courts
have varied in the extent to which they protect from discovery evidence
generated by defense psychiatric experts.' O' A careful analysis reveals
that different privilege doctrines protect each link in the chain of communication and, together, shield non-witness defense psychiatric expert information from government use. 102
97. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
98. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
99. In the early 1970s, Congress adopted a general witness privilege which reads, in
pertinent part, "the privilege of a witness ...shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts ... in the light of reason and
experience." Fed. R. Evid. 501. Congress initially promulgated a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege, but ultimately did not enact the rule. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
504. The advisory committee note to Proposed Rule 504 left the issue of prosecutorial
discovery of non-testifying experts unsettled. See id. at advisory committee's note.
This open-ended standard has led to a preoccupation with litigative fairness. See Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1654 ("During the 1970's... the work product doctrine and the
attorney-client privilege... fell victims to general concepts of litigative fairness applied in
a vague and uncritical manner. As a result, states have diminished the protections for the
criminal defendant under both these doctrines."). This notion of fairness has led some
courts to apply common law privileges equally to the prosecution and to the defense in an
effort to make all information available to both parties. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 641
S.W.2d 54, 58 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (requiring prosecutorial discovery out of fairness
given state's duty to disclose exculpatory material), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
Unlike common law privileges, the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants do not apply equally to the prosecution. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the Supreme Court held that due process requires the government to turn over any exculpatory material to the defense. See id. at 86-87. This rule would ensure defense discovery
of state-sponsored psychiatric examinations that proved favorable to the defense. By contrast, the government has no due process right to any inculpatory evidence uncovered by
the defense, including unfavorable psychiatric evaluations. See Edney, 425 F. Supp. at
1052; Carter, 641 S.W.2d at 66 (Seiler, J., dissenting). But see State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d
338, 348 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (acknowledging Brady but holding discovery proper due
to "the reciprocal nature of the criminal discovery process and the unique nature of the
evidence at issue").
100. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the BoundariesBetween the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 19, 31-32 (1990).
101. See supra part II.
102. The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine "rest on somewhat
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A.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege possibly is the most vital common law

privilege belonging to criminal defendants.' °3 It is the oldest privilege

intended to protect confidential communications. ' 4 The traditional rationale for protecting client communications from adversarial discovery
was to prevent attorneys from having to reveal information or testify
against their clients.10 5 The modem rationale for the privilege is to encourage clients to make complete disclosure to their attorneys in order to
facilitate more effective representation.' 0 6
The common law attorney-client privilege protects all communications
made directly between attorneys and their clients for purposes of obtaining legal advice.'0 7 The Supreme Court has noted, however, that
"[o]ne of [the] realities [of litigation in an adversarial system] is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of [expert consultants] in...
preparation for trial."'0 8 As a result, courts have supplemented the atdifferent conceptual bases and provide sometimes overlapping and sometimes unique protection against discovery by the prosecution." Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1653.
103. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2290, at 543 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
104. See id at 542; Edna S. Epstein & Michael M. Martin, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine 1 (2d ed. 1989).
105. See I McCormick on Evidence § 87, at 314-17 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter McCormick on Evidence]; Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 1.
106. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); United States ex rel.
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); McCormick on Evidence, supra
note 105, § 87 at 314; Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 3.
107. There exist several formulations of the attorney-client privilege. See United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 118 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988); Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 13-14.
Typically, four factors establish the attorney-client privilege. First, the privilege only
protects communications. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 14. This protection
extends to the content of the disclosures, but not to the facts contained therein if they
could be discovered from non-privileged sources. See id.; see also Imwinkelried, supra
note 100, at 31 (drawing distinction between defendants' statements to expert and rest of
experts' information). Facts observed, therefore, are not necessarily protected. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 15. This is relevant to psychiatric examinations during
which experts may make personal observations to matters such as demeanor and affect,
about which they may be asked to testify.
Second, the privilege only extends to communications between certain persons. These
include clients, their attorneys, and any agents of either for purposes of legal representation. See id at 24. For a discussion of attorneys' agents as privileged persons, see infra
notes 108-10 and accompanying text. Third, the privilege only protects communications
made in confidence. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 44. Communicating persons must have a reasonable intent and expectation that the content of their disclosures
will not be revealed to parties outside the attorney-client relationship. See id. Finally,
the privilege only protects communications made for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or
providing legal assistance. See id at 54. These elements, together, establish that the
attorney-client privilege absolutely protects all communications irrespective of any competing interests in disclosure. See id at 99.
108. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
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torney-client privilege with agency principles" °9 to protect client confidences when communicated to third parties hired by defense counsel to
assist in trial preparation." ° This theory recognizes that communica109. As one court notes, "[t]he agency rule recognizes that the complexities of practice
prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients' affairs without the help of others."
Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); see also Wigmore,
supra note 103, § 2301 at 583 (noting that "privilege must include all persons who act as
the attorney's agents"); Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 30 (arguing that definition of
attorneys' agents "should not depend on formalities of agency law" but rather on functional analysis); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1676 (noting that attorney-client privilege
protects defendants' statements to attorneys' agents if made for purposes of obtaining
legal services). To qualify as agents for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, third
parties must be working for and under the control of attorneys. See Epstein & Martin,
supra note 104, at 41. Therefore, lawyers, and not clients, should employ those individuals. See id. at 42.
110. Courts have protected client communications to numerous varieties of trial preparation assistants. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1973)
(accountants); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972) (same); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, and paralegals); see also Mary E. Phelan, The Pitfalls of Presenting a
Diminished CapacityDefense, Crim. Just., Fall 1990, at 8, 10 (published by ABA Section
on Criminal Justice) (discussing extension of privilege to individuals hired by counsel to
assist in trial preparation).
Experts hired by defense counsel to advise and assist in trial preparation have been
considered attorneys' agents for privilege purposes. See Epstein & Martin, supra note
104, at 42 (suggesting that expert witnesses retained by counsel who communicate directly to counsel may be agents for purposes of attorney-client privilege); 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 9 503(a)(3)[01](3), at 503-37 to -38
(1993) (noting that attorney-client privilege prevents disclosure by experts of information
obtained from clients); Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 460 (1962) (noting that experts' communications
should be protected to the same extent as those of any other agents); Imwinkelried, supra
note 100, at 26 ("A similar functional analysis of the role of the attorney's expert consultant dictates that the expert ought to be considered the attorney's agent for privilege purposes.").
Some courts have applied this analysis to protect client communications made to defense psychiatric experts for purposes of obtaining legal advice. Courts have reasoned,
often by analogy to other protected agents, that psychiatrists retained by counsel should
qualify for attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036,
1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975) (extending privilege to statements made by defendant to defense
psychiatrist by analogizing to accountants); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.
Supp. 1038, 1047-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (analogizing to interpreters and accountants),
aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); see also
United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that attorneyclient privilege protected taped conversation between defendant and psychiatrist made for
purposes of obtaining legal advice); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 790 (Alaska 1979)
(finding that attorney-client privilege encompasses psychiatric examination); People v.
Lines, 531 P.2d 793, 802-03 (Cal. 1975) (holding attorney-client privilege protected information obtained by court-appointed psychotherapists assessing defendant's sanity);
Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (holding that defense
psychiatrist is agent of defense counsel for purposes of attorney-client privilege); People
v. Knuckles, 589 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d
421, 423-24 (Md. 1979) (same); People v. Hilliker, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971) (same); State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 423-24 (N.J. 1957) (same). But see United
States v. White, 617 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to extend attorney-client
privilege to psychiatrist whom counsel "sounded out"). Commentators concur with this
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tions made to psychiatric experts serve as important a function in effective defense preparation as do communications made directly to counsel.
Whether the attorney-client privilege protects client communications
to non-lawyers depends on striking a balance between counsels' need for

assistance in representation and the fact-finders' need for potentially probative evidence."' Courts refusing to protect communications between
defendants and defense psychiatric experts consulted for litigation purposes express concern for the fact-finders' need for all relevant evidence

on the issue of sanity. 1

2

These courts also express concern for the accu-

racy and completeness of psychiatric evidence."

3

line of reasoning. See ABA Mental Health Standards, supra note 16, § 7-3.3(b) & commentary at 85-88; Stuart J. Cordish, Casenote, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 99, 111 (1979). But see
Friedenthal, supra, at 463 (arguing that attorney-client privilege should only cover communications to attorneys and should not be applied to knowledge of agents); Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 36 (finding analogy to other agents "dangerously
misleading").
111. Courts apply this balancing test when deciding whether to extend privilege doctrines beyond their usual scope. See Phelan, supra note 110, at 10 (noting that when
"faced with an argument to extend the attorney-client privilege [to psychiatrists consulted in trial preparation], courts are forced to strike a balance between compelling policy considerations"); see also Doe v. United States, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193-94 (2d Cir.
1983); Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1054; Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 502 (Nev. 1987); State
v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1035 (Wash. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
But see State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 355 (Vash. 1990) (en banc) (Utter, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[t]his court should not accept the ... balancing test because... the interests
of the adversary system require lawyers and their agents to be able to keep their clients'
secrets, even if the public has a great interest in the information and it cannot be obtained
from other sources").
112. See, eg., Lange v. Young, 869 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir.) (finding court bound by
state's decision not to extend attorney-client protection to defendant's statements to psychiatrist), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1094 (1989); Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1415-16
(6th Cir.) (finding only limited attorney-client privilege to extends to psychiatrists), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983); Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1038, 1054-55 (refusing to extend
attorney-client privilege to psychiatrists); State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 787
(Minn. 1987) (holding communications made to psychiatrist for testimonial purposes not
within privilege because not meant to stay in confidence); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54,
57 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (finding that attorney-client privilege does not extend to psychiatric experts), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 11516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (same), cert denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at
347 (noting that "it would be manifestly unjust to permit [the] defendant to assert an
insanity defense, place his mental state directly in issue, and then allow him protection
from discovery of what may be the best evidence, and perhaps the only truly accurate
evidence, relating to his mental state"); Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1035-36 (finding attorneyclient privilege inapplicable regardless of whether defendant uses psychiatric expert).
Commentators express similar concerns. See, eg., Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 23
(expressing concern that extending privilege to experts "effectively converts a narrow
privilege doctrine into a broad incompetency rule"); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 635
("When a defendant invokes an insanity defense, she opens the door to as much proof
concerning her mental condition at the relevant time as the prosecution can obtain...").
113. Some fear that, because defense psychiatrists typically interview criminal defendants earlier than other mental health experts, they may therefore be in a better position to
determine each defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense. See Edney, 425 F.
Supp. at 1053 ("[A] psychiatrist seeing defendant.., shortly after the event, may have
much more useful information than would a doctor who saw him much later when treat-
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These arguments, however, have received heavy criticism." 4 In fact, a
broad discovery rule does not promote justice because of its chilling effect
on defendants' incentive to cooperate with experts. 1 5 Indeed, "[t]he
most powerful legal disincentive to full disclosure is the defendant's fear
that what he [or she] says during the forensic evaluation will be used
against him [or her] in court."' 16 Allowing the government early access
to defendants to conduct its own psychiatric evaluations may overcome
any potential prejudice to the government by non-discovery.'I 7
ment and soothing time may have intervened to change the defendant's reactions.");
Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1035 (finding defense examination more useful to trier of fact because
it occurred earlier when defendant's memory was clearer and before mental condition
may have significantly changed); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 638-39 (noting same concern). But see Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1679, 1680 & n.372 (doubting whether defense
examination actually occurs at time closer to offense).
Similarly, defendants may have gleaned enough information from prior examinations
to have developed the ability to fool experts into acknowledging a mental disease or defect by the time the government conducts its examination. See Lange, 869 F.2d at 1013
(noting that defendants may manipulate information state receives); Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at
347 (same); Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1035 (concluding that defense-sponsored psychiatric
exam would be more relevant to issue of defendant's sanity than prosecution-sponsored
exam); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 639-41 (arguing that use of first expert at trial is
justified because defendant will be in better position to convince second expert of mental
defect). But see Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 353 (Utter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[n]or should
we assume that the defense psychiatrist not called to testify has accurate evidence, while
the prosecution's expert and the defense's testifying expert provide inaccurate information").
Finally, defendants may be more cooperative with defense psychiatrists, perhaps denying the government a "fair opportunity to litigate." Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 636-37;
see also Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1035 (expressing view that defendants will be more cooperative with defense psychiatrists).
114. See, e.g., Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 356 (Utter, J.,dissenting) (finding Professor
Saltzburg's analysis unsupported and unpersuasive); ABA Mental Health Standards,
supra note 16, § 7-3.3 commentary at 86-88 & n.20 (disputing rationales offered to allow
prosecutorial discovery). But see Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1035 (relying on Professor
Saltzburg's "complete and convincing discussion").
115. Courts and commentators favoring prosecutorial discovery ignore its effect on
defense-sponsored examinations. If courts allow the government to utilize the results of
these evaluations, they may suffer the same defects as those of subsequent governmentsponsored examinations. See, e.g., Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 792 (Alaska 1979)
(arguing that defendant will not be candid during examination if aware of possibility of
disclosure); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 424-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (IThe chilling effect [a rule allowing prosecutorial discovery] would have upon a client's willingness
to confide in his attorney or any defense-employed consultants requires that we align
ourselves with the overwhelming body of authority and reject [the rule]."); Carter, 641
S.W.2d at 66 (Seiler, J.,dissenting) (characterizing as "unrealistic" assumption that defendants will be as open with prosecution psychiatrists as with defense psychiatrists causing prosecutorial discovery to have deterrent effect); Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 356-57 (Utter,
J.,
dissenting) (noting that client's incentive to be candid will disappear once advised that
communications are discoverable). For a further discussion, see Bonnie & Slobogin,
supra note 12, at 497.
116. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 497.
117. Because the government can conduct its own examinations, non-testifying defense
experts usually are not the only available source of information concerning defendants'
mental states. See Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 353 (Utter, J.,dissenting). But see Saltzburg,
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Prosecutorial discovery, therefore, contravenes both parties' interest in
the fullest exposition of the facts.
Only by eliminating the threat of adversarial discovery can courts ensure full disclosure by defendants. The effect is to enable psychiatrists to
render fully informed opinions, thereby enhancing defense attorneys'
ability "to act more effectively, justly, and expeditiously.""'
Courts
must encourage criminal defendants to communicate as openly and honestly with their consulting psychiatrists as with their attorneys; this promotes the truth-seeking function of the adversarial system.' 19
B.

The Work Product Doctrine

Some commentators who concede the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communications between defendants and consulting psychiatrists nevertheless challenge whether this protection extends to all
other information cultivated by examining experts.'
Under this interpretation, communications between psychiatrists and defense counsel fall
outside the attorney-client privilege, as does all other expert information.' 2 1 Rather than extend the attorney-client privilege, courts instead
should turn to the work product doctrine to protect the next link in the
chain of communication between defendants, counsel, and psychiatric
experts.
Attorney consultations with psychiatrists for purposes of determining
the viability of the insanity defense or evaluating mitigating evidence to
present in a capital case should constitute work product. On that basis,
absent extraordinary prosecutorial need or defense waiver, the government should not have access to the impressions of experts not ultimately
supra note 16, at 636 ("[T]he prosecution's right to conduct its own psychiatric examination may not be an adequate substitute for an earlier examination.").
118. United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
119. The state has an interest in encouraging effective defense preparation to eliminate
frivolous claims. See Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 353 tUtter, J., dissenting).
120. See Weinstein, supra note 110, 503(a)(3)[01](3) at 503-36 to -38; Imwinkelried,
supra note 100, at 31.
121. Courts have drawn a distinction between information communicated by clients
and information acquired from other sources. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947), the Supreme Court addressed this distinction within the attorney-client relationship noting, "the protective cloak of [the attorney-client] privilege does not extend to
information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." IdL at 508; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 31-32 (discussing whether expert information other than client communications qualifies for attorneyclient protection).
Commentators distinguish expert information communicated by clients from information otherwise known to the expert, such as special knowledge as the result of training or
opinions drawn from the evaluation. See Friedenthal, supra note 110, at 469; Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 32-37. This distinction may be artificial, however, given
the interrelationship between clients' statements and experts' conclusions. Indeed, it may
be impossible to separate experts' conclusions from the communications upon which they
are based. See Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Colo. 1987) (en banc);
Imwinkeried, supra note 100, at 39-48.
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used at trial. 122 This rule promotes the goals of the work product doctrine by encouraging counsel to pursue all potential lines of defense for
their clients. 12' Because of the availability of government experts to examine defendants and to assist the prosecution at trial, no exceptional
circumstances typically exist to overcome the protection of information
generated by non-witness defense psychiatric experts. 24 Thus, denying
the state access to non-witness defense experts will not likely result in
unfairness.
The work product doctrine is a common law privilege intended to protect from discovery work generated by attorneys in the course of repre26
senting their clients.1 25 The Supreme Court, in Hickman v. Taylor,1
established the work product doctrine in response to discovery issues
confronting civil litigants. The Court has acknowledged that, although
the doctrine "most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery in civil
litigation ... [its] role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal
' 27
justice system is even more vital."'
The work product doctrine stems from courts' desire to protect trial
preparation materials from discovery by adversarial parties. 28 Protected
work product generally includes the "ideas, theories, and strategy about
a case, reflected in 'interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
122. Commentators agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Blumenson, supra note 11,
at 174 (noting that "a general discovery order compelling disclosure of all witnesses'
statements invades the work-product privilege"); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1657 (noting that "the values underlying the work product doctrine justify protecting the defense
against expanded discovery of expert preparation not ultimately introduced at trial").
123. In the civil context, by setting "a higher standard for discovery of materials prepared by experts who are not prospective witnesses.... [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(B)] implicitly recognizes that fear of discovery may deter thorough preparation
.... " 8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2032
(1970) (citation omitted). This fear is equally present in the criminal context. See Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1659 ("[A]t the discovery stage .... the impact of disclosure poses
the most direct threat to vigorous case preparation."). In fact,
[i]f discovery is freely allowed, expert examinations are not likely to be completed in many situations. Thus, either with or without a discovery right, the
state would not receive the expert opinion. Without the protection, however,
the defense effort will be the poorer, and the adversarial goal of a vigorous development of both sides of the issue will suffer.
Id. at 1670 n.335.
124. See Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1662-63 (noting that "[w]hen the expert's opinion
will not be used at trial and other available experts could perform similar tests, the justifications for allowing broad discovery-allowing adequate preparation by the adversary
and true litigative unfairness-are absent"). But see State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 349
n.4 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (noting that "it is not merely impracticable for the State to
obtain the facts and opinions on defendant's sanity or insanity which the defense obtains
through such an examination, it is virtually impossible").
125. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 99-100. Discovery rules have since codified the privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); Fed R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2).
126. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
127. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); see also Epstein & Martin,
supra note 104, at 105 (noting superior importance of work product doctrine in criminal
cases).
128. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 99; Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1659.
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briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible
and intangible ways.' "29 The privilege gives attorneys the freedom to
prepare cases and strategize in private, 30 thus promoting the generation
of material for use at trial 31 and encouraging innovative approaches to
case preparation and presentation.13 2 Unlike the attorney-client privi33
lege, however, work product immunity is qualified.1
Given attorneys' reliance on agents, 34 the doctrine may extend to
work generated by counsel in conjunction with third persons hired to
assist in trial preparation. 35 Under an agency theory, the creative work
product of experts hired to assist attorneys in trial preparation thus may
qualify for work product protection.' 36 Whether the privilege protects
this information again depends on striking a balance between criminal
defendants' interest in avoiding adversarial intrusion and the fact-finders'
interest in discovering potentially probative evidence. 37
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) protects information cultivated by experts retained in anticipation of civil litigation but not expected to testify in court.' 3 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
have yet to incorporate this restriction on prosecutorial discovery. A
small number of defendants have argued, with limited success, that the
work product doctrine protects both communications between defense
counsel and non-witness psychiatric experts and all material developed
by experts in anticipation of litigation, unless used at trial.' 9 Courts
129. See Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 613 (footnote omitted).
130. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at
614.
131. See Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 37.
132. See Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1662.
133. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 130. Whether courts shield attorney
work product from discovery depends on the material and on the adversarial need. See
id. at 99.
134. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
135. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975); Saltzburg, supra note
16, at 615.
136. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39; Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 37-38.
137. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 99. For a discussion of the balancing
test used by the Hickman Court, see Dale G. Wills, Note, Waiver of the Work Product
Immunity, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 953, 961 (1981).
138. This rule reads:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial,
only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). The need to encourage thorough case preparation justifies
the limitations placed on adversarial discovery of non-witness experts in the civil context.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) advisory committee's note; Mosteller, supra note 51, at
1663-64. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reduce potential unfairness resulting from
nondisclosure by allowing discovery of non-testifying experts upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
139. See eg., State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (summarily
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typically have refused to extend the full protections of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) to experts consulted in the criminal
setting.'4o
Because criminal defendants face more serious penalties, the work
product privilege in the criminal context should embrace the requirements and limitations of the civil rule.'4 1 Under this analysis, courts
should apply the specific protection afforded information developed by
experts consulted in civil cases to evidence developed by experts consulted in criminal cases. This calls for courts and legislatures to redefine
the work product doctrine in the criminal setting to protect opinions generated by non-witness defense experts absent extraordinary prosecutorial

need or defense waiver. 142

C.

Waiver

The concept of waiver typically leads one to envision a voluntary relinquishment of a known right.143 Courts, however, often deny defendants
common law privilege protections based on conduct alone, whether defendants intend to forsake that protection. 4 One commentator suggests
dismissing work product claim as meritless), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); State v.
Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 348-50 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (recognizing work product doctrine has some application and may protect communications between defense counsel and
expert but does not preclude discovery).
140. See Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 348-49. Commentators agree that the common law privilege protects consulting experts only in the civil context. See Edward A. Tomlinson,
ConstitutionalLimitations on ProsecutorialDiscovery, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 993, 1050
(1986).
141. The extent of criminal discovery was the subject of a lecture given by Justice
William Brennan in 1989. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (1990) (Tyrell
Williams Memorial Lecture delivered March 8, 1989). Justice Brennan argued that civil
and criminal discovery should be coextensive given the importance of criminal defendants' liberty interest. See id. at 12.
142. See Carter, 641 S.W.2d at 64 (Seiler, J., dissenting); Pawlyk, 800 P.2d at 357-59
(Utter, J., dissenting); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1661-63.
143. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84
Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1617 (1986). Defendants waive any attorney-client protection by
calling examining psychiatrists to testify or by relying on non-witness experts' reports at
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that
defendant waived privilege by calling expert as witness); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784,
792 (Alaska 1979) (holding that defendant waived privilege when testifying expert relied
on report of non-testifying expert); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 424 (Md. 1979) (holding
that defendant may expressly or impliedly waive right to confidentiality); McCormick on
Evidence, supra note 105, § 93 at 130 (stating that court may find waiver by words or
conduct expressing intent to relinquish or by partial disclosure); Bonnie & Slobogin,
supra note 12, at 497 (noting that defense waives privilege by presenting expert testimony
as part of case); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1673 n.345 (noting that waiver occurs when
defendant voluntarily reveals confidential communication); Wills, supra note 137, at 964
(same). In addition, the ABA Standards also provide for waiver if the defendant exhibits
bad faith by securing evaluations from every qualified expert. See ABA Mental Health
Standards, supra note 16, § 7-3.3(b)(ii).
144. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104, at 60 (noting that "waiver occurs even
when the client does not understand that the effect of his [or her] action is to forfeit the
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that when "waiver is appropriately defined, legitimate defense interests
can be protected while maintaining discovery for information that may
be presented at trial as to which advance notice is critical."' 45 Unless
defendants make use of protected material," the decision to raise the
insanity defense should not constitute a waiver of either the attorneyclient privilege or the work product immunity. Nevertheless, whether
defendants waive either the attorney-client privilege or the work product
protection by presenting any evidence on the issue of sanity is
unresolved.1 47

To decide whether the assertion of insanity effectuates a waiver of privilege, both attorney-client and work product, courts balance the benefit
of the privilege against the public interest in full disclosure of pertinent
information regarding defendants' mental health.' 48 Some courts have
held that merely by asserting the insanity defense, criminal defendants
waive all claims of privilege with respect to any prior psychiatric evaluations. 149 In United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 5 0 for example, Judge
Weinstein found the privileges waived based on "considerations of fairprivilege"); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1679 n.369 ("'[W]hen the defendant introduces
his [or her] expert's testimony... [w]hat occurs is surely no waiver in the ordinary sense
of a known and voluntary relinquishment, but rather merely the product of the court's
decree that the act entails the consequence-a decree that remains to be justified.' ")
(quoting United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
145. Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1664. Waiving the attorney-client privilege does not
automatically waive the work product protection. See Epstein & Martin, supra note 104,
at 153-54. For a lengthy analysis of the waiver doctrine, see Marcus, supra note 143.
146. As discussed, defendants waive privileges by using protected material at trial. See
supra note 143 and accompanying text; ABA Mental Health Standards, supra note 16,
§ 7-3.3(b)(i)(B); Blumenson, supra note 11, at 174; Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1672-73 &
n.344.
147. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding no
waiver of privilege by raising of defense) with United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F.
Supp. 1038, 1052-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding waiver), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d
556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
148. See Austin v. Alfred, 788 P.2d 130, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (balancing competing interests and finding waiver of any applicable privileges); People v. Knuckles, 589
N.E.2d 1080, 1085 (IlM. App. Ct. 1992) (holding no waiver of attorney-client privilege
regarding defendant's communications with psychiatrist because adverse impact of
waiver on defendant outweighed public interest); see also Wills, supra note 137, at 961
(balancing invasion privacy interests against public policy demands).
149. See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
plaintiff could not rely on privilege because she placed her mental and emotional health at
issue and breached confidential relationship), cerL denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); Edney,
425 F. Supp. at 1052 (holding that defendant waived privilege by invoking insanity defense); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 792 (Alaska 1979) (finding that defendant waived
attorney-client protection); Austin, 788 P.2d at 135 (holding waiver necessary to provide
fact-finder adequate access to available evidence); Singleton v. State, 522 P.2d 1221 (Nev.
1974) (holding that defendant waived privilege as to former attorney by calling other
former attorneys to testify on mental health issues); State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1035
(Wash. 1982) (en banc) (holding waiver necessary in light of public interest in full disclosure), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
150. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
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ness and the salutary concept that the [court] should have adequate access to as much of the available psychiatric testimony as possible where
the defendant's mental state is in issue."1' 1 Other courts have held that

criminal defendants do not waive any and all privileges by raising a

mental health defense. 15 2 In United States v. Alvarez,"s3 the Third Cir-

cuit rejected the waiver argument, holding that the rule impermissibly
infringes on defense
counsels' ability and inclination to adequately pre154
pare a defense.
As shown, courts have generally restricted their analysis of

prosecutorial discovery of non-witness defense psychiatric expert infor-

mation to common law privilege doctrines. 55 This approach reflects a
judicial reluctance to extend or create new constitutional rights and remedies, 156 as well as a desire to retain the flexibility afforded by alternate
decision-making bases. 157 When courts interpret privilege law to allow
prosecutorial access to evidence cultivated by non-witness defense ex151. Id. at 1049. Nevertheless, the court admitted that this evidentiary rule may well
prejudice the defendant. See id. at 1054.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding no
waiver); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that
waiver requires specific disclosure of significant part of privileged communication and
that attorney-client privilege shields communications even if psychotherapist-patient
privilege is inapplicable); People v. Lines, 531 P.2d 793, 802-03 (Cal. 1975) (finding argument for waiver unpersuasive); Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Colo.
1987) (en banc) (holding waiver of privilege by assertion of insanity defense would adversely affect counsel's willingness and ability to explore insanity defense); People v.
Knuckles, 589 N.E.2d 1080, 1085-86 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that "holding that the
privilege is waived ... would have a substantial adverse impact upon defense counsel's
ability to explore and prepare an insanity defense").
153. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
154. See id. at 1047 ("[W]e reject the contention that the assertion of insanity at the
time of the offense waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to psychiatric consultations made in preparation for trial.").
155. See supra part II; see also Lange v. Young, 869 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir.) ("Wisconsin's limitation upon the scope of the attorney-client privilege does not violate the
Sixth Amendment."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1094 (1989); Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d
1408, 1414 (6th Cir.) (noting that "the guarantee of effective counsel does not insulate
from disclosure, on the issue of a defendant's sanity, the opinion of a medical expert who
was retained by the defense as a potential witness"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983);
United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (declining
to elevate attorney-psychiatrist-client privilege to constitutional status), aff'd without
opinion, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); Alvarez, 519 F.2d at
1036 (extending protection solely on privilege grounds); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54,
59 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
932 (1983). But see State v. Mingo, 392 A.2d 590, 595 (N.J. 1978) (holding that state's
conditional discovery rule violated defendant's constitutional right to effective
assistance).
156. The Supreme Court has held that lower courts should avoid reaching a constitutional issue if the case can be decided on other grounds. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
157. See Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1054 ("[I]t seems undesirable . . . to canonize the
majority rule.., and freeze it into a constitutional form not amenable to change by rule,
statute, or further case-law development.").
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perts, however, this flexibility and judicial discretion may endanger criminal defendants' constitutional rights.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCOVERY IN LIGHT OF AKE V. OKLAHOMA

By establishing criminal defendants' due process right to psychiatric
experts to aid in the preparation and presentation of a mental health defense, Ake v. Oklahoma I" raised the narrow issue of access to defense
expert assistance to a constitutional level."5 9 The Ake Court did not indicate, however, whether communications arising from that relationship
are also constitutionally protected from prosecutorial discovery. '" As a
result, courts both before and after Ake have refused to credit constitutional arguments when deciding whether to allow prosecutorial discovery
and use of defense consultations with psychiatric experts. 61 As one
commentator notes, "[s]ince attorney-client-psychiatrist communications
158. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
159. TheAke Court firmly grounded its holding in due process. See id. at 86-87. Nevertheless, Ake also implicates the Sixth Amendment by emphasizing the needs of indigent
defendants in the adversary process and by stressing defendants' rights to the tools that
would enable the effective presentation of a defense. See id.at 77. Thus, it has been
suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel may also
include the right to mental health experts if defense counsel believe that psychiatric evaluations may support a viable defense. See, eg., Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 497
(noting that Sixth Amendment "entitles a defendant to a competent forensic evaluation
for the purpose of assisting ...in exploring and presenting any available defense based on
psychological aberration"); Decker, supra note 24, at 593-94 (arguing that Sixth Amendment entitles indigents to any assistance counsel would require); Harris, supra note 42, at
766 n.28 (suggesting that Sixth Amendment might support right to psychiatric expert
assistance); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1664 ("The sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel should independently provide protection for defense experts in appropriate situations."); Goodman, supra note 42, at 724-25 (comparing defendants' right
to counsel to their right to psychiatric expert under "functional analysis"). For a further
discussion of Ake, see supra part I.B.
160. The constitutional implications of prosecutorial discovery of unfavorable defense
psychiatric experts are paramount given that this issue frequently arises in petitions for
federal habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Lange v. Young, 869 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir.)
(refusing to grant writ after finding no constitutional violation), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1094 (1989); Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1415-16 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1010 (1983); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 682 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981) (finding
itself bound by Texas privilege law and denying writ), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982);
United States ex reL Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding
itself bound by New York privilege law and denying writ), aff'd without opinion, 556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
161. See, e.g., Lange, 869 F.2d at 1013 (noting that even if allowing defense psychiatrist to testify for state violated attorney-client privilege, no constitutional violation occurred); Noggle, 706 F.2d at 1410 (finding that medical experts' testimony revealing
defendant's incriminating statements did not violate Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Granviel, 655 F.2d at 683 (denying defendant habeas relief on either attorney-client or
Sixth Amendment grounds); Edney, 425 F. Supp. at 1044 (noting that prosecutorial discovery may be unwise as matter of evidentiary policy, but is not necessarily unconstitutional). One commentator remarks, "[i]f you're thinking about attaching . . . [a
constitutional] argument.., forget it-these too have routinely been rejected." Phelan,
supra note 110, at 13.
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are not protected elsewhere, the only recourse may be to directly challenge the constitutionality of such a holding once again." '1 62 The Ake
decision provides the basis for just such an endeavor.
As shown, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine
together protect all material arising out of defense consultations with
psychiatric experts for purposes of litigation. 163 These common law privileges may implicate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.I 64 While never formally extending constitutional
protection to attorney-client communications, the Supreme Court has indicated that government interference in the attorney-client relationship
may violate the Sixth Amendment.1 65 Lower courts and commentators
have found that the Sixth Amendment may provide a constitutional basis
162. Mary D. Wright, Casenote, State v. Carter: Narrowing the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Crippling Blow to the Insanity Defense, 51 UMKC L. Rev. 386, 398 (1983).
163. See supra part III.A-B.
164. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to explore and
present a defense by ensuring equal access to the courts through various procedural protections. See U.S. const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment reads in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Id. This guarantee is a fundamental right made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
The Supreme Court has held that procedural protections are of little use to criminal
defendants without counsel to enforce them. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988).
The Court has interpreted this guarantee of counsel to mean the right to effective representation. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932). This interpretation both ensures fair trials with just resolutions
and preserves the "proper functioning of the adversarial process." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
165. In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that the "[g]overnment violates the right
to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to
make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense." 466 U.S. at 686. Similarly, the Court has considered significant interferences with counsel's ability to defend to
be Sixth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that government violated Sixth Amendment by recording conversations between defendant and co-defendant who was acting as state agent); Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976) (holding that court denied defendant effective assistance by preventing
defense counsel and defendant from consulting during overnight recess); Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (holding that court violated Sixth Amendment by denying
defense right to summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)
(holding that rule requiring defense to testify first or not at all violated Sixth Amendment); O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam) (holding that government violated Sixth Amendment by overhearing telephone conversation between counsel
and defendant); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that use of defendant's incriminating words deliberately elicited in absence of counsel violated Sixth
Amendment); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (holding that ban on direct examination of defendant violated Sixth Amendment); see also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449, 472 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to "constitutionally protected attorney-client relationship").
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for the attorney-client privilege.166 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment also
may support the work product doctrine.' 67
Prosecutorial discovery of information developed by non-testifying defense experts thus may infringe impermissibly upon criminal defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights by interfering significantly with counsels' ability
166. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 971 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying attorney-client privilege in conjunction with Sixth Amendment to affirm dismissal of indictment), cert denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1329
(11th Cir.) (extending Sixth Amendment to attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 914 (1983); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981)
("A communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege-and we hold today is
protected from government intrusion under the Sixth Amendment-if it is intended to
remain confidential and was made under such circumstances that it was reasonably expected and understood to be confidential."); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 663
n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (expressing view that attorney-chent privilege may implicate Sixth
Amendment); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that "free
two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth amendment is to be meaningful"); United States v. Rosner,
485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that "the essence of the Sixth Amendment
right is... privacy of communication with counsel"), cer denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974);
State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (Md. 1979) ("While never given an explicit constitutional underpinning, the fattomey-cient] privilege is ... closely tied to the federal...
constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel and could, if limited too severely, make these basic guarantees virtually meaningless."). But see United States ex reZ
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1054-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (refusing to consider attorney-client privilege as constitutional matter), aff'd without opinion, 566 F.2d 556 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977); State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 345 (Wash. 1990)
(en banc) ("We do not agree that the attorney-client privilege is of constitutional dimension.").
Commentators support this interpretation. See, eg., Saltzburg, supra note 16. at 603
("Although the privilege is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment arguably may extend constitutional protection to much of the present scope of the privilege."); Joshua T. Friedman, Note, The
Sixth Amendment, Attorney-Client Relationshipand Government Intrusions: Who Bears
the UnbearableBurden of Proving Prejudice?,40 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 109,
110 (1991) ("Communication between the defendant and counsel must remain confidential for the right to counsel to have any meaning."); Richard Hempfling, Comment, The
Sixth Amendment Implicationsofa GovernmentInformer's Presenceat Defense Meetings,
9 U. Dayton L. Rev. 535, 541 (1984) (noting that communications usually protected by
attorney-client privilege should also be protected by Sixth Amendment); David R. Lurie,
Note, Sixth Amendment Implications of Informant Participationin Defense Meetings, 58
Fordham L. Rev. 795, 801-02 (1990) ("The sixth amendment. ..strictly limits a government investigator's ability to interfere with attorney client communications .. "); Note,
Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1143, 1145 (1984) (arguing that Sixth Amendment "subsumes the attorney-client privilege"); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules. Balancing and
ConstitutionalEntitlement, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 464, 485-86 (1977) (noting importance of
attorney-client privilege to Sixth Amendment).
167. See Blumenson, supra note 11, at 174 (noting that "'the (work product] doctrine
is a component of the sixth amendment right to counsel and therefore immune from
legislative or judicial invasion' ") (quoting Nicholas R. Allis, Limitationson Prosecutorial
Discovery of the Defense Case in FederalCourts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 461, 507-10 (1977)); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1663 ("The work product doctrine, as applied to defense preparation, rests on values that support broader protections
for the defense than to the prosecution. These include the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel...").
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to investigate and present the insanity defense.' 6 8 The threat of adversarial discovery places criminal defense attorneys in a difficult dilemma.
On one hand, by pursuing a mental health defense through court-appointed psychiatric experts, counsel risk creating witnesses for the prosecution.' 69 On the other hand, counsel risk violating the Sixth
Amendment by failing to investigate this line of defense. 7 0° The obvious
chilling effect upon defense attorneys' willingness to investigate and pursue the insanity defense for their clients conflicts with the policies underlying the Sixth Amendment.' 7 1 In addition, risk of disclosure diminishes
168. As one commentator notes, "[u]nless we are only cynically guaranteeing a right to
effective assistance of counsel, the sixth amendment must protect counsel's ability to investigate and prepare a defense without the fear that any misstep may help convict the
defendant." Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1573.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1041 (3d Cir. 1975) (prosecution called defense psychiatrist to testify for government at trial); Miller v. District Court,
737 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (noting that "[d]efense counsel should not run
the risk that a psychiatrist who is consulted to prepare for trial may be forced to become
an involuntary prosecution witness"); State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Iowa) (state
used defense expert in case-in-chief), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); State v. Carter,
641 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (state called non-testifying defense expert to
rebut insanity defense), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024,
1034-36 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) (defense expert allowed to testify for state to rebut insanity defense), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); Phelan, supra note 110, at 10 (noting
that discovery forces counsel to "run the risk that a psychiatric expert hired to give advice on the defendant's mental condition may be forced to be an involuntary government
witness"). But see Lange v. Young, 869 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir.) (noting that "the
possibility that the defendant might 'create' evidence for the government is a risk that the
defendant must accept in order to pose the defense"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1094 (1989).
This may prejudice defendants in the eyes of the jury. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 609 P.2d
866, 869 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that prosecution intentionally brought adverse nature of defense expert's opinion to jury's attention); see also Lange, 869 F.2d at 1014
(noting that jury may be unduly prejudiced if told that psychiatrist was originally employed by defense).
Discovery may also cause defendants to unwittingly assist the prosecution in discharging its burden of proof on the issue of sanity. See, e.g., Alvarez, 519 F.2d at 1047 (noting
that "[tihe attorney should not be inhibited from consulting one or more experts, with
possibly conflicting views, by the fear that in doing so he [or she] may be assisting the
government in meeting its burden of proof"); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 425 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1979) (noting that "fain additional consequence of [discovery] ...is that the
defense, in essence, would be required to assist the prosecution in discharging its burden
of proof"); Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1663 (noting that privileges should be broadly
construed when applied to defense preparation given "the absence of a due process responsibility to provide information helpful to the prosecution").
170. See, e.g., Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding failure
of defense counsel to explore possibility of insanity defense deprived defendant of effective
assistance); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (same);
Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1967) (same).
171. In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Supreme Court recognized that the
possibility that the defense psychiatrist might later testify against the defendant raised
real concerns regarding its "effect of foreclosing meaningful exploration of psychiatric
defenses." Id. at 538. Lower courts and commentators also have expressed concern regarding the chilling effect of discovery. See, e.g., Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 791-92
(Alaska 1979) (noting likelihood that discovery will inhibit defense counsel's effort tc
become fully informed); State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 351 (Wash. 1990) (en bane) (Ut.
ter, J.,dissenting) (noting that "counsel will often refrain from consulting experts whc

1993]

WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION

defendants' willingness to cooperate with counsel and psychiatric experts.' 72 The rationale supporting the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel thus "is fundamentally in conflict with a system
that requires counsel to provide the government with the product of his
(or her] efforts when they prove damaging to the defense."' 7 3
CONCLUSION

Courts should prohibit prosecutorial discovery and use of information
generated by non-witness psychiatric experts consulted by criminal defendants in the course of preparing for trial or a capital sentencing proceeding. The attorney-client privilege protects communications between
clients and experts. The work product doctrine protects communications
between experts and defense counsel and all other expert information.
Additionally, the mere assertion of the insanity defense at trial should
not constitute a waiver of these privileges. Finally, a broad rule granting
prosecutorial discovery of information cultivated by non-testifying experts appointed pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma' 7 4 potentially violates
criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.
might be inclined to find sanity in their clients"); Mosteller, supra note 51. at 1666 (noting that "courts are concerned about a potential 'chilling' effect upon counsel's efforts in
general. . ."). But see Lange, 869 F.2d at 1013 (finding "[t]hat defense counsel's efforts
will be 'chilled' because a defense psychiatrist may be called by the government is, quite
simply, difficult to believe").
172. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
173. Mosteller, supra note 51, at 1573; see also United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d
1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[A] rule [allowing discovery] would. . . have the inevitable
effect of depriving defendants of the effective assistance of counsel in such cases.").
174. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

